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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2725 
___________ 
 
BEZALEL GROSSBERGER, 
a/k/a BEN GROSS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PATRICK RUANE; MARION RUANE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-03728) 
District Judge:  Honorable Ann E. Thompson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 
10.6 
August 2, 2012 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed:  August 10, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Bezalel Grossberger, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the District 
Court entered in his lawsuit against Patrick and Marion Ruane.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will summarily affirm.  
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 Grossberger commenced a pro se civil rights action against the Ruanes related to 
an unconsummated property transaction and seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1981, 1982, and 1985.  The Ruanes moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that 
Grossberger’s claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.  They also 
maintained that Grossberger had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.  The District Court agreed with the Ruanes and dismissed the complaint.  See 
generally Grossberger v. Ruane
 On March 27, 2012, the District Court denied the motion, again finding that the 
statute of limitations barred the claims of discrimination.  The Court also found that 
permitting an amended complaint would be futile.  On April 25, 2012, Grossberger filed 
a motion for reconsideration, which, on May 8, 2012, the District Court denied as 
untimely filed.  Three days later Grossberger moved to reinstate the complaint.  The 
District Court denied this motion as well, finding that it was another attempt to get 
reconsideration of arguments already presented.  This appeal followed. 
, No. 11–cv–3728, 2011 WL 6257178 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 
2011).  Grossberger filed a motion to amend the complaint the same day and later filed a 
brief in support of the motion.  This motion and its supplement, in addition to seeking to 
assert a claim of fraudulent conveyance, arguably challenged the dismissal of his 
complaint.   
 Although Grossberger specifies only the latest order of the District Court on his 
notice of appeal, his subsequent filings include argument and discussion that could be 
interpreted as an attempt to appeal additional orders of the District Court.  In an 
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abundance of caution, we will address the scope of this appeal.  We have jurisdiction to 
review the order denying the motion to reinstate the complaint, but we do not review the 
District Court’s orders entered December 14, 2011; March 27, 2012; and May 8, 2012, 
due to a lack of appellate jurisdiction.  The District Court dismissed the complaint on 
December 14, 2011.  Grossberger filed his motion to amend the complaint that same day 
and later filed a brief, which contained some argument on the merits.  Arguably, this 
motion and its brief could be construed as a request for reconsideration or relief from 
judgment, which would toll the time for appeal pending the District Court’s disposition of 
the motion.  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). 
 In an order entered March 27, 2012, the District Court denied Grossberger’s 
motion, and the time for appeal commenced.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) (time for appeal 
runs from entry of order disposing of Rule 4(a)(4) tolling motion).  Grossberger’s request 
for reconsideration in April did not further toll the time for appeal.  While a post-
judgment motion filed within ten days tolls the time in which to file an appeal from the 
underlying judgment, a second motion to reconsider does not.  See Aybar v. Crispin-
Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1997) (subsequent motion for reconsideration served 
more than ten days after entry of original judgment does not toll time for appeal from 
original judgment) (citing cases).  Moreover, this motion was untimely as to the form of 
relief requested, within the meaning of Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A), and therefore could not 
toll the 30-day appeal period.
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 The notice of appeal was, however, timely filed with respect to the denial of the 
motion to reinstate the complaint.  We thus have jurisdiction to review that later order 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448, 462 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(“Although we do not have jurisdiction over the Dismissal Order, we do have jurisdiction 
over the District Court’s orders denying [the appellant’s] motions for reconsideration 
because [he] filed a timely notice of appeal as to those orders.”). 1
 The District Court treated this filing as a motion for reconsideration, but it might 
better be viewed as a motion under Rule 60(b).  Our standard of review for a denial of a 
Rule 60(b) motion is abuse of discretion.  
  
See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 
244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008).  Whether viewed as a filing under Rule 59(e) or 60(b), we agree 
with the District Court that Grossberger has presented no basis for granting relief from 
the prior judgment.  The motion does not demonstrate any clearly erroneous findings of 
fact, erroneous conclusions of law, or misapplications of law to fact.  See Reform Party 
of Allegheny County v. Allegheny County Dep’t of Elections
                                              
1 In their response to the notice of possible summary action, the appellees argue 
that the appeal should be dismissed as untimely because it was filed 31 days after the 
order in question was filed.  The time for filing a notice of appeal, however, runs from the 
, 174 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 
1999) (en banc).  At best, Grossberger’s motion demonstrates his dissatisfaction with the 
District Court’s decision.  Rule 60(b) does not provide relief from a judgment for such a 
reason, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying this post-judgment 
motion. 
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 Accordingly, because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s May 14, 2012 order.  See
                                                                                                                                                  
date the order was entered, not when it was filed.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1).  
Grossberger’s appeal was entered on the 30th day. 
 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 
I.O.P. 10.6. 
